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motion to dismiss, EPA's approval of Oklahoma's TMDLs.
Furthermore, the court disagreed with the assertion that Citizens
lacked the knowledge necessary to fully plead this APA claim. In so
holding, it noted that because EPA's actions regarding Oklahoma's
TMDLs were a matter of public record and part of EPA's motion to
dismiss.
Third, Citizens challenged the district court's denial of a motion to
amend their complaint. The court said the district court did not abuse
its discretion in so doing. The court explained, saying untimeliness
alone was a sufficient reason to deny leave to amend. Citizen's request
to amend was untimely because they knew EPA approved some of
Oklahoma TMDLs in April 1998, and did not file their application for
leave to amend until February 2000.
Finally, Citizens asserted the district court erred when they struck
Citizens' affidavit from a TMDL expert. The court affirmed the
district court's decision because the expert's opinion regarded the
substantive inadequacy of Oklahoma's TMDLs. Thus, the affidavit
exceeded the scope of legal issues and was consequently waived, unless
The court held justice
the ends of justice dictated otherwise.
of the waiver and
informed
were
supported the waiver because Citizens
court's grant of
district
the
affirmed
chose to proceed. Thus, the court
summary judgment on all issues.
Kirstin E. McMillan
FEDERAL CLAIMS COURT
Brace v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 649 (2002) (Denying summary
judgment because genuine issues of material facts existed as to: (1)
whether or not a sufficient nexus existed between plaintiffs land and
interstate water; and (2) the size of the "parcel as a whole" for
purposes of the Penn Centraltest).
Plaintiff, Robert Brace, brought suit against the federal
government ("United States") in the United States Court of Federal
Claims, alleging that the United States took his land without just
compensation when he was ordered to cease operation of a drainage
system located on his property, and to restore parts of his land to its
prior condition, which resembled wetlands. Brace argued that because
the Clean Water Act ("CWA") did not apply until 1977, the United
State's action interfered with the reasonable, investment-backed
expectations he had when he bought the property in 1975.
This case concerned the United States' second motion for
summary judgment. The court denied the first motion because the
court did not have the information it needed to determine the
economic impact, if any, on Brace. In its denial of the United States'
first motion for summary judgment, the court ruled that Brace failed
to meet factors (1) and (3) of the three factors used to determine
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whether or not a regulatory taking has occurred (known as the Penn
Central test).
Those three factors are: (1) the character of the
governmental action or regulation; (2) the economic impact of the
regulation on the claimant; and (3) the extent to which the regulation
has interfered with reasonable investment-backed expectations. The
Supreme Court has recognized that the third prong of the Penn Central
test alone may be determinative over a takings claim.
In this case, the court made note of the fact that it had already
found there was no taking under the third prong of the Penn Central
test, and therefore the court would be within its prerogative to grant
summary judgment to the United States. However, the court declined
to do so, stating "the absence of a factual record combined with recent
developments in takings jurisprudence ... does not support allowing

defendant's motion for summary judgment."
Brace's opposition to the United States' second motion for
summaryjudgment centered on the scope of the CWA. Brace argued
that because his land was not connected to navigable waters, the CWA
did not apply. In determining this question, the court turned to the
Supreme Court case, Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United
States Army Corps of Engineers ("SWANCC"). There, a consortium of
Chicago cities banded together to develop a disposal site for nonhazardous solid waste. The group purchased an abandoned gravel site
that had filled with water and become a habitat for migratory birds,
and then filed permits with the Corps of Engineers to refill some of
the ponds in which the birds were living. The Corps of Engineers
denied the permits, and the consortium challenged the decision
under the Administrative Procedure Act. The Seventh Circuit ruled
for the Corps of Engineers, and on appeal, the Supreme Court
reversed the Seventh Circuit's ruling. The Supreme Court recognized
that under § 404(a) of the CWA, the Corps had jurisdiction over
wetlands adjacent to navigable water because there is a significant
nexus between the wetlands and the navigable waters. However, the
Court refused to extend that jurisdiction to ponds that are not
adjacent to open water because, "the text of the statute would not
allow this." As a result, the Court held that isolated ponds wholly
located in two counties (of Illinois) do not fall under § 404(a)'s
definition of navigable waters solely because they are a habitat for
migratory birds.
The court in this case found the record unclear as to whether or
not a nexus existed between Brace's land and interstate water. The
court stated that if the facts were to indicate that Brace's land is not
connected to interstate water, then the issue of whether or not there
was a taking would be moot, because under SWANCC, the United
States does not have authority to regulate isolated ponds or wetlands
that are not connected to interstate commerce. On the other hand, if
a sufficient nexus were proved between Brace's land and interstate
water, then the court could grant the motion for summary judgment.
In addition, the court found that there was still a factual dispute about
what the "parcel as a whole" was for purposes of the second prong of
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the Penn Central test (the size of the "parcel as a whole" is needed to
determine the economic impact on the plaintiff).
Thus, the court denied the United States' second motion for
summary judgment because genuine issues of material facts existed as
to (1) whether or not a sufficient nexus existed between Brace's land
and interstate water; and (2) the size of the "parcel as a whole" for
purposes of the Penn Central test. In denying the motion, the court
ordered both parties to file a joint status report within forty-five days
that would include "precise information regarding the size of the
parcel as a whole, and location of the parcel in relationship to any
ditch, canal, or channel that could lead to an interstate water. The
court then urged the parties to try settling this matter.
David M.Jacob
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS
Altamaha Riverkeepers v. City of Cochran, 162 F. Supp. 2d 1368 (M.
D. Ga. 2001) (holding Altamaha Riverkeeper, a non-profit
environmental organization, had Article III standing to sue the City of
Cochran for multiple NPDES violations; the citizen suit was not barred
by actions taken by the Environmental Protection Division against the
City in response to such permit violations).
Altamaha Riverkeeper ("ARK") is a non-profit organization formed
to protect and maintain the habitat, water quality, and flow of the
Altamaha River. The City of Cochran ("City") obtained a National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit from the
Georgia Department of Natural Resources, Environmental Protection
Division ("EPD"). The permit would allow the City to operate a
wastewater facility that discharged treated wastewater into Jordan
Creek, a tributary of the Ocmulgee River located in the Altamaha
River Basin. ARK brought this citizen suit under the Clean Water Act
("CWA"), which requires that all "point sources" obtain an NPDES
permit and operate in conformity therewith. Through delegation by
the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), the EPD issues and
enforces all NPDES permits in Georgia.
ARK alleged the City violated its NPDES permit on numerous
occasions spanning from July 1995 to April 2001. ARK based its
argument on Discharge Monitoring Reports the City submitted to the
EPD, which revealed violations of the discharge limits allowed under
the City's NPDES permit. The City asserted ARK's individual members
lack Article III standing to bring this suit. The City further contended
since the EPD was currently enforcing the City's NPDES permit, the
citizen suit was "duplicative" and "intrusive," and, thus, ARK was
barred from bringing this suit.
The court emphasized individual members of an organization
must have standing to sue in their own right and the interest at issue

